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While organizations want to encourage collaboration, individual free riding 
undermines the success of collaborative efforts. In this paper, I investigate whether it is 
possible to mitigate free riding problems through altering how individual performance is 
framed when reported. On the one hand, individuals could report their performance using 
an individualistic frame that only focuses on the individual’s net cost of collaboration, 
which will merely highlight the incentive to free ride. In contrast, individuals could instead 
report their behavior using alternative frames that emphasize collaborative aspects of their 
actions. Drawing on research in psychology, I predict that individuals who report under 
collaborative frames will be more willing to collaborate than those who report under an 
individualistic frame. Utilizing an anonymous and single-shot public goods game, I 
demonstrate that contribution amounts are higher with collaborative frames than with an 
individualistic frame. Results also suggest that the reporting frames alter participants’ 
reasoning focus, which helps to explain their levels of collaboration. Further, a second 
experiment shows that performance reporting frames impact collaboration even in a 
repeated setting. My findings have broad implications for organizations that face free riding 
problems, from individual firms that want to encourage collaborative efforts among their 
employees to organizations that want to encourage firms to invest more in public goods. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Collaboration is pervasive and important to business success and economic 
development. Well-developed abilities to create and maintain fruitful collaboration award 
companies a significant competitive advantage. Examples of collaboration include 
teamwork within an organization, communities, strategic alliances, and joint ventures. 
Prior research finds that both formal control (goal setting, incentive systems, monitoring) 
and informal control (trust, social norms, reputation) affect collaboration (Nicolaou et al., 
2011; Chua and Mahama, 2007; Emsley and Kidon, 2007; Anderson and Dekker, 2005; 
Coletti et al., 2005; Das and Teng, 1998). In this study, I investigate whether performance 
reporting could be identified as a new potential mechanism to encourage collaboration. 
Specifically, I argue that individuals who report their performance under certain frames 
will collaborate more. 
Investigating how performance reporting frames improve collaboration is 
important. Although companies utilize collaboration as a key strategy to achieve 
competitive advantage, many forms of collaboration are unstable due to free riding 
problem. With incentives to free ride, it is hard to achieve a desired level of collaboration. 
While the existence of complete contracts over collaborative actions could eliminate free 
riding problems, it is prohibitively costly to specify every state of nature in a contract 
(Kreps, 1990; Townsend, 1979). Therefore, this study suggests that a relatively effortless 
method to encourage collaboration is for action takers to report on their collaborative 
performance, even if it is infeasible for a central authority to write optimal ex ante contracts 
around those reported outcomes. For example, member governments commonly report on 
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their contributions to the United Nations, companies issue reports about both their social 
responsibility and their strategic partnerships (e.g., with peer firms, suppliers, industry 
associations, etc.), and managers of subdivisions discuss their collaborative efforts within 
the larger organization. 
To explore whether and how performance reporting frames affect collaboration, I 
utilize a classic public goods game, which is a popular collaborative setting in the literature. 
In a classic public goods game, every individual in one group receives a same amount of 
endowment and decides to invest any to a group account. The payoff to each group member 
is the equal share of the group account balance which is the total investments multiplied 
by a multiplier (Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). By conveying the same information 
regarding contribution behavior, individuals could communicate their contribution 
decision through mentioning one of the following four numbers. From the traditional 
economic perspective, individuals should only care about the net consequence of behavior 
in decision-making processes. Since individuals lose money when contributing, I specify 
those individuals who communicate the net cost of collaboration as reporting under an 
individualistic frame. Alternatively, individuals can report their behavior by concentrating 
on collaborative aspects (i.e., collaborative frames). Individuals could mention their 
contribution amounts when reporting to group members, i.e., the collaborative investment 
frame. Since an amount invested will be multiplied by a multiplier in the group account, 
individuals may highlight in their reports the impact of their investments on final outcomes 
in the group account. I define this reporting format as the investment impact frame. Last, 
because all the members will evenly split the total amounts in the group account, 
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individuals can announce the share they receive from final outcomes, i.e., the share of 
collaborative outcomes frame. 
My hypothesis about performance reporting frames is first grounded in framing 
effects (Levin et al., 1998; Levin and Gaeth, 1988). A large body of literature documents 
how alternative framing of information affects individuals’ judgments and decisions. This 
literature suggests that framing effects occur because information is highlighted relative to 
its descriptive frame in memory, and this emphasis will influence individuals’ decisions. 
Based on this argument, I further argue that the frame that individuals use to report their 
contribution highlights the described information in individuals’ mind, leads individuals to 
focus on emphasized information when thinking about why and how much to contribute, 
and then affects individuals’ contribution amounts. To elaborate, the individualistic frame 
reminds individuals of negative aspects of contributing, exacerbates their propensity to 
focus on the reasons not to contribute, and, consequently, leads to a lower contribution. In 
contrast, the collaborative investment frame, the investment impact frame, and the share of 
collaborative outcomes frame emphasize positive aspects of contributing. Thus, 
individuals under those three frame are more likely to consider reasons to contribute, 
resulting in higher contribution accounts. 
Contribution behavior not only depends on individuals’ own perspective on 
contributing, but also rely on how individuals perceive their group members’ contribution 
behavior. According to social projection theory, individuals tend to think others will 
behave similarly to themselves (Krueger, 1998). Furthermore, research on trust suggests 
that individuals tend to trust their group members when they expect group members to 
collaborate, and this trust will further boost their own performance (Christ et al., 2012; 
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Nicolaou et al., 2011; Das and Teng, 1998; Williamson, 1993). Specifically, because 
collaborative frames highlight positive consequences of contributing, individuals who are 
more likely to contribute in those frames will expect their group members to collaborate 
more. This expectation of group members’ contributions further increases individuals’ trust 
on group members, which in turn increases individuals’ contribution. Conversely, 
individuals under the individualistic frame tend to contribute less and, thus, do not believe 
that group members will contribute. As a consequence, individuals are less likely to trust 
their group members and in turn decrease their contribution.   
I examine how performance reporting frames influence individuals’ collaboration 
via a 1×4 between-subject experiment, varying the frames that participants use to report 
their contribution behavior towards the group members. Consistent with my prediction, the 
results show that individuals using one of the three collaborative reporting frames 
contributed higher amounts to the group account than those using the individualistic frame. 
In addition, planned comparisons indicate that the collaborative investment frame and the 
investment impact frame trigger directionally higher contributions than the net cost of 
collaboration frame, and that the share of collaborative outcomes frame leads to 
significantly larger contributions than the other three frames. To examine participants’ 
reasoning focus, I conduct a mediation analysis and find that reporting frames alter how 
participants consider the choice to invest in collaboration, and in turn change their 
willingness to invest. Particularly, individuals are more likely to focus on reasons to 
contribute if they report their behavior using the collaborative frames, whereas they pay 
more attention to reasons for not contributing when reporting under the individualistic 
frame.  
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I conclude the empirical analyses with a battery of additional tests. First, to offer 
more evidence on whether free riding issues diminish when individuals use the 
collaborative frames in reporting behavior, I examine whether the number of individuals 
who contributed zero to the group account (i.e., complete free riding) is lower in the 
collaborative frames conditions than in the individualistic frame condition. This is indeed 
what the data shows. Second, previous research documents that players’ mean contribution 
is 50% of their endowment in a one-shot public goods game (Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 
1995). Using this result as a benchmark, I find that more individuals give more than 50% 
of their endowment when reporting under the collaborative frames than when reporting 
under the individualistic frame, thus lending further support to my hypothesis. Third, to 
explore the key driver in the reasoning focus, I collect data from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and show that trusting others mediates the relation between reporting frames and 
contribution amounts.  
Since group members often interact with each other for a long time in the real world, 
I run a supplemental experiment to test whether performance reporting frames could alter 
individuals’ collaborative behavior even in a repeated setting. The results from a repeated 
public goods game provide evidence that performance reporting frame could still influence 
collaboration in a setting with reputation. Specifically, in the first round, I replicate that 
individuals are more likely to contribute under the three collaborative frames than under 
the individualistic frame. Then in subsequent rounds, I find that the effects of reporting 
frames persist until the penultimate round, supporting the effects of reporting frames even 
in a setting with reputation. 
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My study first contributes to the literature on the mechanisms to overcome free 
riding. Two lines of studies are most closely related to my work. First, numerous studies 
in behavioral economics provide evidence that information about others’ actions affects 
contributions in public goods games (Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). However, one 
authority should be present in the game to provide that information to players, limiting the 
generalization of this method. Second, extant studies suggest that frames of a public goods 
game have the potential to mitigate free riding problems (Böhm and Theelen, 2016). 
However, frames of information are rarely noticed (Nikiforakis, 2010). I add to the 
literature by showing performance reporting frames as an alternative tool to encourage 
collaboration without demanding an authority and without changing frames of the game. 
Second, the insights from testing performance reporting frames shed light on the 
real effects of disclosure (Kanodia and Sapra, 2016). Prior studies on real effects of 
disclosure have examined whether disclosure affects product quality (Jin and Leslie, 2003) 
and workplace safety (Christensen et al., 2017). Studies have also pointed out that 
disclosure could change firms’ risk management (Zhang, 2009), internal capital allocation 
(Cho, 2015), and corporate investment (Shroff, 2017). My study extends this important line 
of inquiry by showing that disclosure also affects free riding in collaborative settings, such 
as team production and debt negotiation (Teoh, 1997). 
Third, my results have direct implications on recent corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) literature and practice. Recently, burgeoning developments in CSR disclosure 
guidance have led to variations in CSR practice. When reporting CSR activities, companies 
typically use frames that can be categorized into the four groups in this paper. While 
regulators have a strong desire to standardize CSR disclosure guidance, literature on the 
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implications of existing disclosure practices are limited to boost the standardization process 
(Martin and Moser, 2016; Moser and Martin, 2012). Martin and Moser (2016) find that 
investors respond favorably to CSR reports with social impact information. In addition, 
they find that, by anticipating investors’ preference, managers tend to highlight social 
impact when disclosing CSR activities rather than net cost to companies. My paper adds to 
this research stream by showing that the framing effects can influence managers’ 
willingness to engage in CSR activities. The finding should be of interest to regulators, 
preparers, and readers who seek to formalize or understand CSR reports.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature; In 
Chapter 3, I develop my theoretical prediction; Chapter 4 describes the experimental 
design; Chapter 5 reports the main results and additional analyses; Chapter 6 introduces a 




CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Collaboration 
Over the past several decades, managers have given considerable attention to the 
importance of building a collaborative enterprise (Prusak, 2011; Coletti et al., 2005). An 
increasing number of managers realize that maintaining a collaborative environment in a 
firm has become a key corporate asset. In a survey of training workers, over ninety percent 
of respondents indicate that they work with other people as a team in daily work (Allerton, 
1996). Similarly, over eighty percent of senior executives in a survey conducted by Ernst 
and Young (2013) indicate that team effectiveness is critical for their organizations to 
maintain a competitive advantage. Moreover, based on the data collected by Cross et al. 
(2016), managers and employees spend 50% more time on collaborative activities than 
they did in the past two decades. In addition, organizations become increasingly engaged 
in inter-organizational collaborations, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures (Nicolaou 
et al., 2011). Accordingly, collaboration is taking over the workplace.  
While collaboration provides a variety of advantages to business success, 
maintaining a collaborative environment in any group is hard due to free riding problems. 
Individuals are willing to collaborate because they believe they can gain more from 
collaborating. However, without information about others’ behavior in the group, 
individuals have incentives to free ride because they could benefit from others’ 
collaborative output without any personal input. When everyone in a group has incentives 
to free ride, no one is willing to collaborate and collaboration fails.  
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Management accounting plays a critical role in improving collaboration through 
designing and implementing management controls. To induce favorable behavior from 
employees in pursuit of organizational goals, management teams design a variety of control 
mechanisms to constrain the decision making of employees (Birnberg and Snodgrass, 
1988). Those controls are often formal mechanisms, such as segregating duties, 
implementing policies, providing performance-based compensation, using supervisor 
reviews, and so on (Christ et al., 2012). For example, Ittner et al. (1999) find that supplier 
partnerships benefit from an increased monitoring practice. Coletti et al. (2005) reveal that 
monitoring mechanisms enhance perceived trustworthiness among collaborators and then 
increase collaboration. In the context of a public goods game, Sefton et al. (2007) and Fehr 
and Gächter (2000) suggest that monetary punishments and rewards can overcome free 
riding and encourage collaborative behavior. In addition, Maas and van Rinsum (2013) 
find that individuals tend to overstate their performance more if their reports increase others 
payoff than if those reports decrease others’ payoff. In summary, evidence suggests that 
management teams can design formal control systems to help realize specific 
organizational goals.  
While formal controls can be useful in mitigating free riding problems, they can 
also be costly or infeasible for management to enforce in settings where it is hard to 
measure employee inputs. As an alternative, informal controls implement social pressure 
to employees by communicating organizations’ value statements with no explicit 
mechanisms to enforce (Berry et al., 2009). Typical informal controls could be social 
norms, trust, and group identifications (Rowe, 2004; Towry, 2003; Kachelmeier et al., 
2014). In a laboratory experiment, Rowe (2004) provides evidence that successfully 
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inducing a group frame will motivate collaboration among individuals. Kachelmeier et al. 
(2014) argue that communicating values to employees will induce them to focus more on 
quality than quantity. In this spirit, I next consider the role of informational nudges. 
2.2 Informational Nudges 
My study is most closely related to literature on informational nudges. 
Informational nudges, a style of information provision intended to alter societal behavior, 
serves as a popular nonpecuniary measure in encouraging collaborative behavior and 
diminishing free riding behavior (Bao and Ho, 2015). For example, lab and field 
experiments have shown that providing information about others behavior can influence 
individual behavior in a public goods game (Sell and Wilson, 1991; Croson, 2001; Croson 
and Shang, 2008; Kreitmair, 2015). 
More specifically, Sell and Wilson (1991) find that, in a public goods game, 
individuals’ contribution amounts are higher when they have information about how other 
group members have contributed than when they don’t have this information. This 
information effect is even stronger when the information is available every round (Cason 
and Khan, 1999; Gächter et al., 1996). In a field experiment of public radio fundraising, 
Shang and Croson (2009) find that the most influential level of contribution information is 
selected from the contribution at the 90th to 95th percentile of all prior contributions. In 
addition, in two large field experiments, Ayres et al. (2013) find that feedback on peer 
comparisons reduces energy consumption, such as home electricity and natural gas usage, 
at a low cost. Combined, this literature points out that descriptive norms serve as effective 
means in encouraging collaborative behavior (Bao and Ho, 2015; Cialdini et al., 1990). 
 11 
While informational nudges have become gradually prominent in the literature, 
they rely significantly on third parties to provide information to decision-makers regarding 
relative behavior information. However, information could also be available without third 
parties if individuals are required to self-report their behavior. Therefore, one 
underexplored area is how decision makers’ disclosure of behavioral information affects 
their own collaborative behavior. Individuals’ anticipation of submitting reports about their 
actions could potentially affect their ex ante willingness to collaborate. In the next section, 
I consider framing effects to better understand how reports might be used as informational 
nudges in a public goods game. 
2.3 Framing Effects 
Over the past few decades, studies on framing effects have proliferated in the area 
of behavioral economics and business. Principal of extensionality suggests that individuals 
should behave similarly when information and incentive contracts are identical (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 2000; Arrow, 1982). As a violation of extensionality, framing effects occur 
when divergent descriptions of the same information encourage different decisions.  
A number of studies in behavioral economics have documented the existence of 
framing effects in responses to social dilemma. More specifically, studies in behavioral 
economics explicitly place their emphasis on how framing effects could be utilized to 
mitigate free riding problems. For instance, Nikiforakis (2010) examines earnings feedback 
and contribution feedback under threat of peer punishment in a public goods game, 
implying that earnings feedback has a negative effect on contribution whereas contribution 
feedback has a positive effect on contribution. Ellingsen et al., (2012) reveal that just 
 12 
labeling a social dilemma game as a “stock market game” makes the collaboration more 
likely than labeling that as a “community game”. In a repeated public goods game 
experiment and an applied vignette experiment, Böhm and Theelen (2016) provide 
evidence that both outcome valence framing and externality valence framing of the task 
influence people’s willingness to engage in collaborative behavior.  
Similarly, framing effects have also attracted attentions from accounting 
researchers. The most popular framing in accounting research is the framing of incentive 
contracts, comparing positively framed bonus contracts with negatively framed penalty 
contracts. For example, Luft (1994) asserts that people tend to choose a bonus contract 
over a penalty contract. Hannan et al. (2005) extend this stream of research by arguing that 
penalty contracts could trigger higher agent effort than bonus contracts. Nevertheless, in 
an incomplete contract setting, Christ et al. (2012) provide evidence that penalty contracts 
lead to lower effort than bonus contracts. Adding to this stream of literature, I identify four 
different reporting frames and examine the role of those frames in encouraging 
collaboration. In a mandatory reporting setting, I expect that individuals’ willingness to 
collaborate will change based on the frame they use to report their behavior. I present a 
study in which I manipulate the reporting frames in a public goods game and show how 
anticipation of sending a report under diverse frames sways individual collaborative 
behavior. The four different reporting frames are further explained as follows. 
In a standard public goods game, individuals in the same group are privately 
endowed with the same amount of money and decide whether they want to collaborate. 
The money individuals allocate to the group account will be multiplied by a parameter and 
the final amount in the group account will be evenly shared by all group members 
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(Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). Consistent with traditional economic perspectives, 
individuals should only care about their net cost of collaboration when deciding the amount 
to give to the group account. Therefore, the reporting frame regarding the net cost of 
collaboration is defined as an individualistic frame. Alternatively, individuals can focus on 
other collaborative aspects of their behavior in reporting (i.e., collaborative frames). One 
obvious way to talk about an individual’s own behavior in this game is to just report the 
contribution amount (i.e., collaborative investment frame). In addition, an individual could 
inform group members about the total increased amount in the group account due to the 
contribution decision (i.e., investment impact frame). Furthermore, since all group 
members will evenly split the final amount in the group account, individuals can announce 
the amount they receive based on their own contribution (i.e., share of collaborative 
outcomes frame). Taken together, four alternative frames are available to report 




CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To compare contribution amounts in those four frames, I refer to framing effects. 
Levin et al. (1998) first demonstrate that there are three different types of framing effects, 
including risk choice framing, attribute framing, and goal framing. Those frames affect 
decisions with different underlying mechanisms and consequences. Risk choice framing, 
the standard view of framing, is manipulated through the presentation of a choice in two 
prospects. One is a sure thing prospect and the other is a two-outcome chances prospect. 
Attribute framing refers to a scenario that a single attribute of an object is the manipulated 
frame and evaluation of that object is the measured variable. Different from risk choice 
framing and attribute framing, goal framing is designed to impact individuals’ implicit 
goals and find a more powerful goal enhancer. The evaluated situation may be framed as 
whether the subject provides benefits or whether the subject prevents losses. Since my 
reporting frames focus on only one aspect of the collaborative behavior in one report, my 
setting is closely related to attribute framing.  
Attribute framing works because information is emphasized in individuals’ mind 
based on its descriptive frame. Specifically, positive framing emphasizes positive 
information and stimulates positive associations with the evaluated object; whereas 
negative framing highlights negative information and stimulates negative associations. 
Russo et al. (1996) demonstrate that the mere presence of positive associations with one 
object will positively distort individuals’ evaluation of that object. However, negative 
associations of an object in memory could result in negative distortions in individual 
judgments. Hence, attribute framing influences information presentation in associative 
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memory, and this presentation difference is the cause of valance-consistent evaluation. 
Based on this argument, I propose that the frame individuals use to report their behavior 
will highlight the described information in their memory, shift individuals’ reasoning focus 
to those highlighted information associations, and then alter individuals’ decisions to be 
consistent with the frame valence.   
In a collaborative setting, individuals’ decision not only relies on how they consider 
collaboration, but also relates to how they think about other collaborators’ behavior. 
Individuals are less likely to collaborate if they believe that other collaborators are more 
willing to free ride. Therefore, it is critical to understand how others will behave in the 
collaborative game. Social projection theory suggests that individuals have the tendency to 
believe that others will behave similarly to themselves (Krueger, 1998). In addition, recent 
research documents that individuals will trust their group members if they believe their 
group members are willing to collaborate, which in turn will increase individuals’ 
performance (Christ et al., 2012; Nicolaou et al., 2011; Das and Teng, 1998; Williamson, 
1993).  
Based on the above arguments and framing effects, I argue that individuals under 
the collaborative frames pay attention to the positive associations of collaboration and then 
are more likely to contribute. At the same time, individuals trust their group members 
because they believe that other group members will behave similarly to them, which further 
enhance their propensity to collaborate. In contrast, the individualistic frame highlights the 
negative aspects of collaborating and then leads individuals to focus on thinking about 
negative aspects of contributing. Therefore, individuals are less likely to contribute. In 
addition, individuals under the individualistic frame will not trust their group members 
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since they think their group members have similar behavior to themselves. This mistrust 
further decrease individuals’ own contribution. Therefore, compared with the net cost of 
collaboration frame, the three collaborative frames could trigger higher contribution 
amounts from individuals. My hypothesis is formalized as follows: 
Hypothesis: Contributions to a public goods game are higher when the 
collaborative reporting frames are used than when the individualistic frame is used. 
Due to the lack of robust theories, I make no prediction about the comparison in 
terms of contribution amounts among the three collaborative frames. 
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 1 
4.1 Experimental Task 
My experiment uses a one-shot public goods game, which is programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants are randomly 
assigned to groups of three, and each participant is endowed with $10 that could be 
contributed to a group account. Each dollar they contributed is multiplied by 1.5, 
resulting in $1.5 in the group account. The three group members will evenly split the total 
amount in that account after every member contributes. In other words, each participant 
could get $0.5 back per dollar allocated to the group account and the net cost of the 
contribution is $0.5 per dollar. After making contribution decisions, participants are 
required to submit a report about their contribution behavior to all group members based 
on the frame manipulation (see Appendix A, B, and C). They then see the three reports 
from all members and check their own payoffs. 
4.2 Experimental Design 
The 1 × 4 between-subject design incorporates the frames that participants use to 
report their behavior to all group members. For instance, as shown in Appendix C, the four 
distinct frames of these reports are operationalized as follows if a participant contributes 
$5:  
1) The net cost of collaboration frame, in which the participant reports her net cost, 
$2.5, after contributing;  
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2) The collaborative investment frame, in which the participant reports her 
contribution amount, $5;  
3) The investment impact frame, in which the participant is guided to report how 
the group benefits from her contribution as a whole, $7.5;  
4) The share of collaborative outcomes frame, in which the participant announces 
the amount she gets back from her contribution, $2.5.  
My primary dependent variable is contribution amounts participants allocate to 
the group account. 
4.3 Experimental Procedures 
Upon arrival, each participant was assigned a number and provided with written 
instructions and details about her compensation contract. To ensure that they were 
comfortable with the game, participants were asked to complete a short quiz and the 
experiment did not begin until they answered all the questions correctly. Before the actual 
game started, participants were guided to play a practice round to get familiar with the 
public goods game and to ensure that they understood the decision task. In this practice 
round, each subject acted as all three members of a group (one at a time) and was not paid. 
Participants then began the actual round and were informed that their decisions in this 
round determined their payoff. In this round, participants were first asked to make 
contribution decisions (see Appendix B) and submit a report depending on their condition. 
To take a close look at how they form their contribution decisions, before seeing the reports 
from all group members, participants were required to write down the reasons why they 
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contributed the amount that they did. Upon completion of the actual round, participants 
completed a post-experimental questionnaire.  
Participants received a show-up fee of $5. Additional compensation is based on 
group members’ contribution decisions. More specifically, the payoff function for each 
participant is the endowment plus a personal share of the final amount in the group account 
minus their own contribution. That is, there were no incentives for the participants to 
contribute any amounts to the group account. Hence, economic equilibrium analysis 
assuming self-interested behavior implies $0 would be allocated to the group account. In 
my experiment, participants’ payoff ranged from a low of $10 to a high of $25, with an 
average payoff of $17.64.  
4.4 Participants  
I recruited student volunteers from the undergraduate population at a large US 
public university. A total of 96 students participated in one of eight 30-minute sessions, 
with 9 to 15 participants per session. These students were randomly assigned to one of the 
four experimental conditions, with 24 in each condition. On average, participants are 20 




CHAPTER 5. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, Panel A reports descriptive statistics by experimental cells related to my 
main dependent variable, contribution amounts. Corroborating previous public goods game 
experiments, all conditions show non-zero contributions, with a grand average of $5.27. 
Moreover, cell means suggest that participants’ contributions in the net cost of 
collaboration frame condition are directionally lower than those in the collaborative 
investment frame condition, the investment impact frame condition, or the share of 
collaborative outcomes frame condition. This pattern of results is consistent with my 
prediction. 
Table 1: Contribution Amounts 



































Intercept 2667.04 1 2667.04 184.38 < 0.001 
Reporting 
Frames 
134.21 3 44.74 3.09 0.031 
 








-3, +1, +1, 
+1 
58.68 1 58.68 4.06 0.047 
Residual 78.52 2 39.26 2.61 0.08 
 
Panel D: Planned Comparisons 
Comparison Difference df t-Stat p-Value 
Share>Net Cost 3.22 46 3.16 0.0028 
Investment Impact>Net 
Cost 
1.42 46 1.21 0.20 
Collaborative 
investment>Net Cost 
0.79 46 0.68 0.49 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and results of hypothesis tests of participants’ 
contributions amounts. In this experiment, participants are asked to contribute money to a 
group account in a public goods game. Depending on their condition, they then are asked 
to report their contributions behavior to group members in one of the subsequent frames: 
the net cost of collaboration, the collaborative investment, the investment impact, or the 
share of collaborative outcomes. The primary dependent variable is participants’ 
contribution amounts.  
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for participants’ contribution amounts. 
Panel B presents the one-way ANOVA test that evaluates whether the participants’ 
contribution amounts differ across the four conditions.  
Panel C presents the planned contrast test whether the participants’ contribution amounts 
in the collaborative investment frame condition, the investment impact frame condition, 
and the share of collaborative outcomes frame condition are higher than those in the net 
cost of collaboration frame condition. I perform this comparison by using contrast 
coefficients of -3 for the net cost of collaboration frame condition, +1 for the collaborative 
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investment frame condition, +1 for the investment impact frame condition, and +1 for the 
share of collaborative outcomes frame condition. 
Panel D presents the results of planned comparisons between the alternatives frames in the 
collaborative frame and the individualistic frame.  
All p-Value are two-tailed. 
 
5.2 Tests of Hypothesis 
My hypothesis considers the effect of reporting frames, suggesting that three 
collaborative frames could trigger higher contribution amounts than an individualistic 
frame. For this purpose, I first report a one-way ANOVA that examines the 1×4 model, 
using contribution amounts as the dependent variable. My test results, presented in Table 
1, Panel B, show that there are statistically significant differences in contributions to the 
group account between the four different reporting frames (p=0.031, two-tailed), which 
falls into the pattern predicted by the hypothesis. 
I then use planned contrasts to formally test my prediction because I expect that 
three collaborative frames have higher contributions than the individualistic frame 
(Guggenmos et al., 2016; Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990). More specifically, I use 
contrast coefficients of -3 for the net cost of collaboration frame condition, +1 for the 
collaborative investment frame condition, +1 for the investment impact frame condition, 
and +1 for the share of collaborative outcomes frame condition. The contrast determines 
whether the mean contribution of the three collaborative reporting frames is higher than 
the mean contribution of the individualistic frame. As reported in Table 1, Panel C, my 
hypothesis is supported (p=0.047, two-tailed). This result suggests that individuals who 
expect to report their behavior under collaborative reporting frames tend to allocate more 
money to the group account than those under the traditional economic frame. 
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Finally, I report tests of planned comparisons to provide further insights about the 
role of reporting frames in boosting collaborative actions. In particular, I compare the mean 
contribution in each of the three collaborative frame conditions with that in the net cost of 
collaboration frame condition. Table 1, Panel D indicates that the share of collaborative 
outcomes frame induces higher contribution amounts than the net cost of collaboration 
frame condition (p=0.0028, two-tailed). However, individuals in the investment impact 
frame condition and the collaborative investment frame condition have directionally higher 
contribution amounts than those in the net cost of collaboration frame condition, albeit that 
the differences are not statistically significant (p=0.20 and p=0.49, respectively, two-
tailed). Overall, this pattern of results is consistent with my hypothesis. 
5.3 Mediation Analysis 
As noted in the experimental procedures, participants in all conditions were guided 
to offer their reasoning as to why they contributed the amount that they did. My theory 
suggests that individuals are induced to update their reasoning focus differentially when 
they consider whether to contribute. More specifically, I expect to see that individuals with 
one of the collaborative frames will mainly think about “why” to contribute, whereas those 
under an individualistic frame will focus on reasons not to contribute.  
To examine differences in participants’ reasoning focus, two Ph.D. students 
independently coded the reasons which were written by participants, evaluating to what 
extent all the listed reasons oppose or support contributing to the group account on a 6-
point Likert scale. These Ph.D. students were either blind to my manipulation or not 
informed as to the purpose of my study while conducting their coding. Initial inter-rater 
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reliability on the coding of participants’ responses was 71 percent, suggesting a high initial 
agreement (Stokes et al. 1995). Those two coders met to reconcile any inconsistencies and 
the reconciled data were used in the subsequent analysis. Based on the reconciled data, I 
create a reasoning focus and code it as 1 if the reasons support contributing and 0 if the 
reasons oppose contributing. As depicted in Figure 1, the indirect effect is significant 
(z=2.72, p=0.006, two-tailed) and the direct effect is insignificant (z= -0.05, p=0.96, two-
tailed).1 Therefore, this mediation analysis provides further evidence for my theory that 
reporting frames alter individuals’ reasoning focus and then affect individuals’ willingness 
to contribute. 










                                                 
1 Following Hayes (2013), I use 5,000 bootstrap samples to test whether reporting frames impact contribution 
amounts through reasoning focus. I also run the mediation analysis by using the 6-point reasoning coding, 










This figure depicts regression coefficients from a mediation analysis. In the experiment, 
participants are asked to write down “the reasons why you contributed the amounts that 
you did”. Two independent coders are guided to code the reasons as supporting or opposing 
contributing to the group account on a 6-point Likert scale. Reasoning focus is coded as 1 
if the reasons support contributing and as 0 if the reasons oppose contributing.  
***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
in a two-tailed test. 
 
To take a close look at how reporting frames affect individuals’ reasoning focus, I 
collected additional data by employing 100 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) to code the reasons obtained in my experiment. As I propose in the hypothesis 
development section, when considering others’ actions, individuals are more willing to 
contribute if they trust their group members. Also, previous literature suggests that free 
riding issues could be reduced if individuals are willing to take risks to be the only 
contributor in the game (Baggio et al., 2015; Schill et al., 2015). What is more, regardless 
of others’ actions, individuals give their endowment to public goods maybe because of 
generosity (Wang et al., 2011). Workers from AMT were guided to evaluate each reason 
along these three dimensions: 1) generosity, 2) trust, and 3) risk taking. For each 
dimension, workers were asked to choose one of the following answers: 1) “Yes”, 2) “No”, 
or 3) “Not Related”.  
To measure individuals’ willingness to trust, take risks, and be generous, I calculate 
a rate for each dimension of one individual by using the frequency difference between 
“Yes” answer and “No” answer divided by the total number of coding for one individual. 
I then create trust, risk-taking, and generosity, assigning 1 if the rate of that dimension is 
not less than 50% and 0 if the rate of that dimension is not higher than -50%. Figure 2 
presents the mediation analysis results of those three dimensions.  
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Figure 2: Mediation Analysis: Part II 










































This figure depicts regression coefficients from three mediation analyses by using the 


























Panel A shows the results of a mediation analysis of trust. Workers were guided to evaluate 
whether one reason expresses “I am willing to trust others.” They chose one of the 
following answers: “Yes”, “No”, “Not Related”. Trust is coded as 1 if the Equation (1) is 
higher than or equal to 50% and as 0 if the Equation (1) is lower than or equal to -50%. 
                                                
The number of "Yes"−The number of "No"
The total number of coding
                                             (1) 
Panel B shows the results of a mediation analysis of risk-taking. Workers were guided to 
evaluate whether one reason expresses “I am willing to take risks.” They chose one of the 
following answers: “Yes”, “No”, “Not Related”. Risk-taking is coded as 1 if the Equation 
(1) is higher than or equal to 50% and coded as 0 if the Equation (1) is lower than or equal 
to -50%. 
Panel C shows the results of a mediation analysis of generosity. Workers were guided to 
evaluate whether one reason expresses “I am willing to be generous.” They chose one of 
the following answers: “Yes”, “No”, “Not Related”. Generosity is coded as 1 if the 
Equation (1) is higher than or equal to 50% and coded as 0 if the Equation (1) is lower than 
or equal to -50%. 
***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
The significant relationship between the three mediators and contribution amounts 
indicates that individuals’ willingness to trust, take risks, and be generous leads to higher 
contributions (p<0.01, p=0.043, p<0.01, respectively, two-tailed). While reporting frames 
do not affect generosity (p=0.823, two-tailed), they do significantly influence trust and 
risk-taking (p=0.098, p<0.01, two-tailed). Therefore, not all dimensions mediate the 
relationship between reporting frames and contributions. Following the bootstrapping 
method in Hayes (2013), I find no evidence on mediation effects of generosity (p=0.82, 
two-tailed) and limited evidence on mediation effects of risk-taking (p=0.09, one-tailed)2. 
Trust is the only variable that mediates the effect of reporting frames on contribution 
                                                 
2 It is because the effects of both risk-taking and reporting frames on contribution amounts are no longer 
significant when they are in the same model. 
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amounts (p=0.066, one-tailed). Collectively, reporting frames influence individuals’ 
tendency to collaborate through their willingness to trust others. 
5.4 Supplemental Analyses 
To provide further support for my hypothesis, I examine the frequency of 
individuals who contributed zero to the group account (i.e., complete free riding). Table 2, 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the number of complete free riding. A 
untabulated logistic regression result indicates that the frequency of complete free riding 
in the net cost of collaboration frame condition is not significantly higher than that in the 
collaborative conditions (p=0.25, two-tailed). The frequency of complete free riding in the 
share of collaborative outcomes frame condition is significantly lower than that in the net 
cost of collaboration frame condition (p=0.044, two-tailed). Altogether, this direction in 
the frequency of complete free riding is consistent with the main results. 
Prior literature suggests that participants, on average, contribute 50% of their 
endowment to the public goods in a one-shot public goods game (Chaudhuri, 2011; 
Ledyard, 1995). Accordingly, I use $5 (50% of the $10 endowment) as a benchmark to 
distinguish whether individuals engage in moderate free riding. I anticipate that 
collaborative reporting frames could decrease the frequency of moderate free riding. As 
reported in Panel B of Table 2, descriptive statistics show that the number of moderate free 
riding differs across the four conditions. A logistic regression result in Panel C of Table 2 
indicates that the frequency of moderate free riding is significantly lower under the three 
collaborative frames conditions than that under the individualistic frame condition 
(p=0.027, two-tailed). This result provides supplementary support for my hypothesis. 
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Table 2: Free Riding 












































Panel C: Logistic Regression of Moderate Free Riding (Contributions<5) 
Independent Variable Expected Sign Parameter Estimate 
Intercept ? 0.51 
Reporting Frames - -1.08** 
   
Odds Ratio Estimates 
(Reporting Frames) 
 2.95 
No. of Observations  96 
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This table presents additional analyses on free riding. My theory suggests that reporting 
frames could be used to diminish free riding problems. Therefore, I test whether reporting 
frames influence the number of individuals who engage in free riding. 
Panel A presents the frequency of complete free riding in each condition. The frequency 
of complete free riding is defined as the number of individuals contributing $0 to the group 
account. 
Panel B presents the frequency of moderate free riding in each condition. The frequency 
of moderate free riding is measured by the number of individuals contributing less than $5 
to the group account.  
Panel C presents the logistic regression results of moderate free riding. Moderate free 
riding is coded as 1 if participants contribute less than $5 and as 0 otherwise. Reporting 
frames are coded as 0 if the individualistic frame is used and as 1 otherwise. 





CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT 2 
6.1 Background 
Results from the first experiment suggest that performance reporting frames do alter 
individuals’ collaborative behavior in a way that would promote their collaboration under 
a more collaborative reporting frame. From an accounting perspective, the finding provides 
a new mechanism to boost collaboration in any group settings. And to examine the 
underlying mechanisms of how performance reporting frames impact contributions in the 
first experiment, individuals play a one-shot public goods game. However, in real-world 
settings, individuals usually interact with their group members for multiple periods.  
Empirical evidence on whether individuals who interact with the same group 
members for multiple rounds (hereafter, “partners”) behave differently from those who 
play once with their group members (hereafter, “strangers”) is far from conclusive 
(Weimann, 1994; Chaudhuri, 2011). By using a partner-stranger setting, Andreoni (1988) 
provides experimental evidence that strangers contribute more money to the public good 
than partners. Weimann (1994) replicates the partner-stranger setting from Andreoni 
(1988). Surprising, the paper finds that contributions from partners are similar to those 
from strangers in most rounds. Even in rounds with significantly different contributions 
between partners and strangers, partners make higher contributions than the contributions 
of strangers. In a punishment setting, Masclet et al. (2003) point out that non-monetary 
punishments are more efficient in increasing partners’ contributions than strangers’. 
Collectively, partners may have different behavior from strangers. 
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While results from a one-shot game in the first experiment demonstrate that 
performance reporting frames alter strangers’ collaboration, it remains an open question 
whether reporting frames change partners’ behavior in repeated settings. Therefore, by 
designing a repeated public goods game in a second experiment, I examine whether 
individuals’ collaborative behavior differs when they can interact with their group 
members for multiple rounds.  
6.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
In Experiment 2, I employ the same 1 × 4 between-subject design. Independent 
variables and the dependent variable remain the same as in the first experiment. The 
experimental procedures and the setting are also identical to the first experiment, except 
for three changes. First, I increase the number of rounds in this game to at least 7 but no 
more than 10, with each possible number (i.e., 7, 8, 9, or 10) being equally likely. At the 
end of each round, individuals can still see performance reports from all group members 
and then their own payoff in this round. Second, individuals were randomly assigned to 
groups of three at the beginning of the experiment group. And group composition remains 
constant for the whole game. Third, individuals were not asked to write down their reasons 
why they contribute the amount they do in each round.  
6.3 Participants 
A total of 96 students were recruited from the same large U.S. public university as 
in Experiment 1. Those students participated in eight 30-minute sessions and formed 32 
unique groups.  Participants on average are 21 years old and 58 percent are female. They 
earned an average of $18.6, including a $5 show-up fee.  
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6.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics for the four experimental conditions are presented in Table 3. 
The primary dependent variable is participants’ contribution amounts to their group 
account in every round. These contribution amounts are also depicted in Figure 33. The 
main purpose of this second experiment is to test whether and how the four reporting 
frames impact individual collaborative behavior in repeated interactions among group 
members. Therefore, I first investigate whether the results in the first round replicate the 
results in the first experiment, and then consider the long-term effects of reporting frames.  
Table 3: Experiment 2 




































































                                                 
3 Because participants know the game terminates from Round 7 with a 25 percent chance, my analyses focus 





































1 -3, +1, +1, +1 55.72 1 55.72 4.51 0.036 
2 -3, +1, +1, +1 143.51 1 143.51 12.18 0.001 
3 -3, +1, +1, +1 168.79 1 168.79 13.82 0.000 
4 -3, +1, +1, +1 137.04 1 137.04 11.26 0.001 
5 -3, +1, +1, +1 159.16 1 159.16 12.45 0.001 
6 -3, +1, +1, +1 253.81 1 253.81 19.19 0.000 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and results of hypothesis tests of participants’ 
contributions amounts in the supplemental experiment. In this supplemental experiment, 
participants are asked to contribute money to a group account in a repeated public goods 
game. The number of rounds are at least 7 but no more than 10, with each possible number 
(i.e., 7, 8, 9, or 10) being equally likely. Depending on their condition, participants are 
asked to report their contributions behavior to group members in one of the subsequent 
frames: the net cost of collaboration, the collaborative investment, the investment impact, 
or the share of collaborative outcomes. The primary dependent variable is participants’ 
contribution amounts. And to avoid the confounding ending effects, my analyses focus on 
the first 6 rounds.  
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for participants’ contribution amounts in the first 
6 rounds. 
Panel B presents the planned contrast test whether the participants’ contribution amounts  
in the collaborative investment frame condition, the investment impact frame condition, 
and the share of collaborative outcomes frame condition are higher than those in the net 
cost of collaboration frame condition. I perform this comparison by using contrast 
coefficients of -3 for the net cost of collaboration frame condition, +1 for the collaborative 
investment frame condition, +1 for the investment impact frame condition, and +1 for the 
share of collaborative outcomes frame condition. 
All p-Value are two-tailed. 
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Figure 3: Contribution Amounts in the Supplemental Experiment 
 
 
In the initial round, I successfully replicate the results from the primary experiment 
(Panel A of Table 3). Planned contrast results suggest that contribution amounts in the three 
collaborative frame conditions are significantly higher than those in the individualistic 
frame condition (Panel B of Table 3). Untabulated planned comparison results further 
reveal that each of the three collaborative frames stimulate significantly higher contribution 
amounts to the group account than the individualistic frame (all p<0.05, one-tailed). 
Overall, these results replicate the effects of reporting frames I find in the primary 
experiment.  
Second, as depicted in Figure 3, the graph shows that individuals tend to behave 
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willing to contribute more under the three collaborative frames than under the 
individualistic frame in the subsequent five rounds after the first round (Table 3). 
Therefore, I conclude that the effects of reporting frames are still strong in a multi-period 
setting, supporting the idea that certain reporting frames do help to encourage collaboration 
even in a setting with reputation.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I experimentally investigate a new measure that encourages 
collaborative effort and curtails free riding issues. Particularly, I argue that ex post 
reporting frames could lead to different levels of ex ante collaboration in a public goods 
game. Based on the framing effects from psychology literature (Levin et al., 1998), I argue 
that individuals’ contributions depend on the concentration of reporting frames they use to 
report their behavior to group members. Under the collaborative investment frame, the 
investment impact frame, or the share of collaborative outcomes frame, individuals are 
reminded of the personal or group benefits of contribution decisions, concentrate on 
positive aspects of contributing, and in turn contribute high amounts to the group account. 
Conversely, the net cost of collaboration frame reminds individuals of their cost from 
contributing. Hence, individuals focus more on reasons not to contribute and in turn 
contribute low amounts to the group account. 
My findings support my hypothesis in the following ways. First, a planned contrast 
reveals that the three collaborative reporting frames lead to higher contribution amounts 
than the individualistic frame. Second, to provide further insights into the effect of 
reporting frames on collaboration, I demonstrate that the collaborative reporting frames 
reduce free riding issues by decreasing the number of individuals who tend to contribute 
less than $5 to the public goods. Third, my theory predicts that this relationship is mediated 
by individuals’ reasoning focus in thinking through decisions. A mediation analysis 
supports this assertion. Finally, to find the key factor in individuals’ reasoning focus, I 
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conduct supplemental analyses and find that the collaborative reporting frames change 
individuals’ perspectives on trust, and in turn change individuals’ willingness to contribute. 
My study suggests several avenues for future research. First, to clearly attribute the 
contributions differences to the frames of reports, participants are forced to faithfully report 
their decisions but are not allowed to lie. This limits my ability to generalize my results to 
settings where individuals could lie in reporting procedures. Future research could 
investigate how lying affects contributions behavior. Since auditors could audit the reports, 
it would be interesting to investigate how auditing mechanisms work in settings where 
individuals could lie. Second, since my findings in the additional analyses reveal that trust 
mediates the relationship between reporting frames and contribution amount, further 
research could further examine the role of trust in public goods settings. 
My study has several important implications. First, my study adds to the literature 
on real effects of disclosure. While prior research reveals different real effects of disclosure 
(Kanodia and Sapra, 2016), my study extends this stream of literature and suggests a new 
beneficial consequence of disclosure—enhanced collaboration. Second, although previous 
literature explores how feedback information overcome free riding issues in collaborative 
settings (Böhm and Theelen, 2016; Chaudhuri, 2011; Nikiforakis, 2010; Ledyard, 1995), 
my findings suggest an alternative tool to boost collaboration in a way that no authority is 
required to provide that feedback information. Third, Martin and Moser (2016) find that 
managers choose to report CSR information in favor of investors’ preference. Since CSR 
activities are one type of collaboration, I provide a framework for regulators, preparers, 
and readers when categorizing CSR activities or outcomes in CSR reporting.  
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
Net Cost of Collaboration condition: 
Today, each participant, including you, will get an endowment of $10. You and 
another two participants will randomly form a group of three, sharing a public account 
together. You and your group members will individually decide how much you want to 
contribute to the group account, indicating that you allocate the $10 endowment between 
your private account and your group account. Every dollar you contribute to the group 
account will be multiplied by 1.5, resulting in 1.5 dollars increase in the group account. 
You and the other two group members will share the total amount in your group account 
equally. In another word, you lose half dollar per dollar you contribute. After all group 
members make decisions and submit reports, you and the other two group members will 
see all three reports. In other words, how much you lose from your contribution will be 
reported to group members.  
Your compensation = $5 + ($10 – your contribution) + 1/3* (1.5 * all group 
members’ contributions) 
Collaborative Investment condition: 
Today, each participant, including you, will get an endowment of $10. You and 
another two participants will randomly form a group of three, sharing a public account 
together. You and your group members will individually decide how much you want to 
contribute to the group account, indicating that you allocate the $10 endowment between 
your private account and your group account. Every dollar you contribute to the group 
account will be multiplied by 1.5, resulting in 1.5 dollars increase in the group account. 
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You and the other two group members will share the total amount in your group account 
equally. After all group members make decisions and submit reports, you and the other two 
group members will see all three reports. In other words, how much you contribute will be 
reported to group members. 
Your compensation = $5 + ($10 – your contribution) + 1/3* (1.5 * all group 
members’ contributions) 
Investment Impact condition: 
Today, each participant, including you, will get an endowment of $10. You and 
another two participants will randomly form a group of three, sharing a public account 
together. You and your group members will individually decide how much you want to 
contribute to the group account, indicating that you allocate the $10 endowment between 
your private account and your group account. Every dollar you contribute to the group 
account will be multiplied by 1.5. In other words, you will increase the group account by 
1.5 dollars per dollar you contribute. You and the other two group members will share the 
total amount in your group account equally. After all group members make decisions and 
submit reports, you and the other two group members will see all three reports. In other 
words, how much you increase the group account will be reported to group members. 
Your compensation = $5 + ($10 – your contribution) + 1/3* (1.5 * all group 
members’ contributions) 
Share of Collaborative Outcomes condition: 
Today, each participant, including you, will get an endowment of $10. You and 
another two participants will randomly form a group of three, sharing a public account 
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together. You and your group members will individually decide how much you want to 
contribute to the group account, indicating that you allocate the $10 endowment between 
your private account and your group account. Every dollar you contribute to the group 
account will be multiplied by 1.5, resulting in 1.5 dollars increase in the group account. 
You and the other two group members will share the total amount in your group account 
equally. After all group members make decisions and submit reports, you and the other two 
group members will see all three reports. In other words, how much you get back from 
your contribution will be reported to group members. 











APPENDIX C. MANIPULATION 
▪ Individualistic Frame:  
• Net cost of collaboration frame 
             
▪ Collaborative Frames: 
• Collaborative investment frame 
             
• Investment impact frame 
             
• Share of collaborative outcomes frame 





Allerton, H. (1996). Triple threat. Training and Development, 50(5), 16. 
Anderson, S. W., & Dekker, H. C. (2005). Management control for market transactions: 
The relation between transaction characteristics, incomplete contract design, and 
subsequent performance. Management Science, 51(12), 1734-1752. 
Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride?: Strategies and learning in public goods 
experiments. Journal of public Economics, 37(3), 291-304. 
Andreoni, J. (1995). Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion? The 
American Economic Review, 891-904. 
Arrow, K. J. (1982). Risk perception in psychology and economics. Economic 
Inquiry, 20(1), 1-9. 
Ayres, I., Raseman, S., & Shih, A. (2013). Evidence from two large field experiments that 
peer comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage. The Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 29(5), 992-1022. 
Baggio, J., Rollins, N., Pérez, I., & Janssen, M. (2015). Irrigation experiments in the lab: 
trust, environmental variability, and collective action. Ecology and Society, 20(4). 
Bao, J., & Ho, B. (2015). Heterogeneous effects of informational nudges on pro-social 
behavior. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 15(4), 1619-1655. 
Berry, A. J., Coad, A. F., Harris, E. P., Otley, D. T., & Stringer, C. (2009). Emerging 
themes in management control: A review of recent literature. The British 
Accounting Review, 41(1), 2-20. 
Bigoni, M., & Suetens, S. (2012). Feedback and dynamics in public good 
experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 82(1), 86-95. 
Birnberg, J. G., & Snodgrass, C. (1988). Culture and control: a field study. Accounting, 
organizations and society, 13(5), 447-464. 
Bochet, O., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2006). Communication and punishment in voluntary 
contribution experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60(1), 
11-26. 
Böhm, R., & Theelen, M. M. (2016). Outcome valence and externality valence framing in 
public good dilemmas. Journal of Economic Psychology, 54, 151-163. 
Buckless, F. A., & Ravenscroft, S. P. (1990). Contrast coding: A refinement of ANOVA 
in behavioral analysis. Accounting Review, 933-945. 
 45 
Burlando, R., & Hey, J. D. (1997). Do Anglo-Saxons free-ride more? Journal of Public 
Economics, 64(1), 41-60. 
Cason, T. N., & Khan, F. U. (1999). A laboratory study of voluntary public goods provision 
with imperfect monitoring and communication. Journal of Development 
Economics, 58(2), 533-552. 
Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a 
selective survey of the literature. Experimental Economics, 14(1), 47-83. 
Chaudhuri, A., Graziano, S., & Maitra, P. (2006). Social learning and norms in a public 
goods experiment with inter-generational advice. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 73(2), 357-380. 
Cho, Y. J. (2015). Segment disclosure transparency and internal capital market efficiency: 
Evidence from SFAS No. 131. Journal of Accounting Research, 53(4), 669-723. 
Chua, W. F., & Mahama, H. (2007). The effect of network ties on accounting controls in a 
supply alliance: field study evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(1), 
47-86. 
Christ, M. H., Emett, S. A., Summers, S. L., & Wood, D. A. (2012). The effects of 
preventive and detective controls on employee performance and 
motivation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29(2), 432-452. 
Christensen, H. B., Floyd, E., Liu, L. Y., & Maffett, M. G. (2017). The real effects of 
mandated information on social responsibility in financial reports: Evidence from 
mine-safety records. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 64(2-3), 284-304. 
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative 
conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public 
places. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(6), 1015. 
Coletti, A. L., Sedatole, K. L., & Towry, K. L. (2005). The effect of control systems on 
trust and cooperation in collaborative environments. The Accounting 
Review, 80(2), 477-500. 
Column, A. M. (1982). Game theory and experimental games: The study of strategic 
interaction. 
Cookson, R. (2000). Framing effects in public goods experiments. Experimental 
Economics, 3(1), 55-79. 
Croson, R. T. (2001). Feedback in voluntary contributions mechanisms: an experiment in 
team production. In Research in Experimental Economics (pp. 85-97). Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
 46 
Croson, R., & Shang, J. Y. (2008). The impact of downward social information on 
contributions decisions. Experimental Economics, 11(3), 221-233. 
Cross, R., Rebele, R., & Grant, A. (2016). Collaborative overload. Harvard Business 
Review, 94(1), 16. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence in 
partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of management review, 23(3), 491-512. 
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011). The framing of games and 
the psychology of play. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 459-478. 
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Mollerstrom, J., & Munkhammar, S. (2012). Social 
framing effects: Preferences or beliefs? Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 
117-130. 
Emsley, D., & Kidon, F. (2007). The relationship between trust and control in international 
joint ventures: Evidence from the airline industry. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 24(3), 829-858. 
Ernst and Young (2013). The power of many. How companies use teams to drive 
superior corporate performance.  
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods 
experiments. The American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic 
experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178. 
Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (2010). Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free 
riding in public goods experiments. The American Economic Review, 100(1), 541-
556. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? 
Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71(3), 397-404. 
Gächter, S., Fehr, E., & Kment, C. (1996). Does social exchange increase voluntary 
cooperation? Kyklos, 49(4), 541-554. 
Guggenmos, R. D., Piercey, M. D., & Agoglia, C. P. (2016). Making sense of seven 
quandaries: Developing a framework for custom contrast analysis. Working paper: 
Cornell University and University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process 
Analysis. A Regression-Based Approach. 2013. New York: Guilford, 1609182308. 
 47 
Hannan, R. L., Hoffman, V. B., & Moser, D. V. (2005). Bonus versus penalty: does 
contract frame affect employee effort?. In Experimental business research (pp. 
151-169). Springer, Boston, MA 
Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., Nagar, V., & Rajan, M. V. (1999). Supplier selection, 
monitoring practices, and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 18(3), 253-281. 
Jin, G. Z., & Leslie, P. (2003). The effect of information on product quality: Evidence from 
restaurant hygiene grade cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 409-
451. 
Johnson, E. J., Häubl, G., & Keinan, A. (2007). Aspects of endowment: a query theory of 
value construction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 33(3), 461. 
Kachelmeier, S. J., Thornock, T. A., & Williamson, M. G. (2014). Communicated values 
as informal controls: Gaining accuracy while undermining productivity. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 33 (4): 1411-1434.  
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its 
alternatives. Psychological Review, 93(2), 136. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kanodia, C., & Sapra, H. (2016). A real effects perspective to accounting measurement 
and disclosure: Implications and insights for future research. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 54(2), 623-676. 
Kreitmair, U. (2015). Voluntary disclosure of contributionss: an experimental study on 
nonmandatory approaches for improving public good provision. Ecology and 
Society, 20(4). 
Kreps, D. (1990). Microeconomic theory. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Krueger, J. (1998). Enhancement bias in descriptions of self and others. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(5), 505-516. 
Ledyard, J. O. 1995. “Public goods: a survey of experimental research.” Pages 111-194 in 
J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, editors. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.  
Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1993). Focusing in reasoning and 
decision making. Cognition, 49(1), 37-66. 
 48 
Levin, I. P., & Gaeth, G. J. (1988). How consumers are affected by the framing of attribute 
information before and after consuming the product. Journal of consumer 
research, 15(3), 374-378. 
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A 
typology and critical analysis of framing effects. Organizational behavior and 
human decision processes, 76(2), 149-188. 
Luft, J. (1994). Bonus and penalty incentives contract choice by employees. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 18(2), 181-206. 
Maas, V. S., & Van Rinsum, M. (2013). How control system design influences 
performance misreporting. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(5), 1159-1186. 
Martin, P. R., & Moser, D. V. (2016). Managers’ green investment disclosures and 
investors’ reaction. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 61(1), 239-254. 
Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., & Villeval, M. C. (2003). Monetary and 
nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. The American 
Economic Review, 93(1), 366-380. 
Moser, D. V., & Martin, P. R. (2012). A broader perspective on corporate social 
responsibility research in accounting. The Accounting Review, 87(3), 797-806. 
Nicolaou, A. I., Sedatole, K. L., & Lankton, N. K. (2011). Integrated information systems 
and alliance partner trust. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28(3), 1018-1045. 
Nikiforakis, N. (2010). Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good 
experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 689-702. 
Olson, M. (1965). Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Harvard Economic Studies. v. 124). Harvard University Press. 
Prusak, L. (2011). Building a collaborative enterprise. Harvard Business Review, 89(7-8), 
94-101. 
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The American 
Economic Review, 1281-1302. 
Rowe, C. (2004). The effect of accounting report structure and team structure on 
performance in cross-functional teams. The Accounting Review, 79(4), 1153-1180. 
Russo, J. E., Medvec, V. H., & Meloy, M. G. (1996). The distortion of information during 
decisions. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 66(1), 102-110. 
Schill, C., Lindahl, T., & Crépin, A. S. (2015). Collective action and the risk of ecosystem 
regime shifts: insights from a laboratory experiment. Ecology and Society, 20(1). 
 49 
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., & Walker, J. M. (2007). The effect of rewards and sanctions in 
provision of public goods. Economic Inquiry, 45(4), 671-690. 
Sell, J., & Wilson, R. K. (1991). Levels of information and contributions to public 
goods. Social Forces, 70(1), 107-124. 
Shang, J., & Croson, R. (2009). A field experiment in charitable contributions: The impact 
of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. The Economic 
Journal, 119(540), 1422-1439. 
Shroff, N. (2017). Corporate investment and changes in GAAP. Review of Accounting 
Studies, 22(1), 1-63. 
Stokes, M. E., C. S. Davis, and G. G. Koch. 1995. Categorical Data Analysis Using the 
SAS System. Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc.  
Teoh, S. H. (1997). Information disclosure and voluntary contributions to public 
goods. The RAND Journal of Economics, 385-406. 
Towry, K. L. (2003). Control in a teamwork environment—The impact of social ties on 
the effectiveness of mutual monitoring contracts. The Accounting Review, 78(4), 
1069-1095. 
Townsend, R. M. (1979). Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state 
verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2), 265-293. 
Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (1995). Coordination rules in asymmetric social dilemmas: A 
comparison between public good dilemmas and resource dilemmas. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 31(1), 1-27. 
Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2000). Decision-induced focusing in social dilemmas: give-
some, keep-some, take-some, and leave-some dilemmas. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 78(1), 92. 
Wang, L., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2011). Economics education and 
greed. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 10(4), 643-660. 
Weimann, G. (1994). The influentials: People who influence people. SUNY Press 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. The journal 
of law and economics, 36(1, Part 2), 453-486. 
Zhang, H. (2009). Effect of derivative accounting rules on corporate risk-management 
behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47(3), 244-264. 
